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ABSTRACT 
In an attempt to gain a better position in haggling, consumers often seek a seller’s pricing information (e.g., whether the posted 
price is negotiable, the discount and transaction prices, etc.) before going to that seller. Although traditionally difficult to obtain, 
such information is becoming increasingly available due to consumer price posting (CPP), whereby consumers post and share 
their purchase price information on the Internet. In this analytical study, we consider a market in which a seller, who chooses 
between a fixed price policy and a haggling policy, serves two types of consumers who differ in their willingness to pay and 
haggling costs. We explore how CPP can affect consumers’ behavior and the seller’s pricing strategies (i.e., pricing policy and 
the associated prices). In the absence of CPP, our model features a two-sided uncertainty: the seller does not know individual 
consumer’s type and thus may find it optimal to use a haggling policy to price discriminate consumers, whereas consumers do 
not readily observe the seller’s cost type and pricing policy, and thus are uncertain whether their haggling will be fruitful. In 
the presence of CPP, consumers’ uncertainty about the seller’s pricing policy is resolved. Because CPP can improve price 
transparency, inhibit consumers’ acceptance of a posted price and spur price haggling, it seems apparent that it should benefit 
consumers and hurt the seller. However, our analysis shows that CPP can lead to fewer purchases, higher prices and even a 
greater seller profit. It further shows that although CPP surely increases information accessibility, it can also reduce the amount 
of information available to consumers. These results are in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom in the literature. 
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